Although Hussein declined the offer, it illustrates how important network security is to warfare, says Thomas Reardon, chief of the Intelligence Division (G2) for the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal Command (NETCOM).

Reardon views information warfare as a transformational issue because it involves radically changing the way commanders think. “You’re working in an area right now that’s become a very high value target,” says Reardon, who spoke at the recent Army LandWarNet Conference. “If someone can get in, they own your network. That should enrage a commander or a leader.”

To Reardon, effective leadership means commanders train their staffs to view network intrusions the same way they do incoming rounds. Defense Systems editor Dawn S. Onley talks to Reardon about the evolution of cybersecurity in meeting systems threats, about whether outsourcing makes the department vulnerable, and what foreign adversaries are really after in the Defense Department’s databases.

DEFENSE SYSTEMS: Talk about your job and mission at NETCOM.
REARDON: We provide intelligence support to the overall mission of NETCOM to serve as the operator, manager and defender of the Army LandWarNet. One of our roles is serving as the broker between the command and the intelligence community to make sure that we leverage all the intel assets that we can to keep the commander informed of threats to the LandWarNet. We work in close concert with the 1st Information Operations Command, their Cyber Intel Center, and other sources to keep the intelligence process moving.

“We must move away from historical reporting and give our network defenders actionable intelligence.”

Another role being developed within the framework of the NETCOM Campaign Plan is to find ways to enable predictive analysis. Our charge from Brig. Gen. Carroll Pollett, NETCOM’s commanding general, is to give him, our risk managers, our network operators and commanders an estimate of where to deploy scarce resources to defend the LandWarNet before the next event occurs—nothing more than what any ground maneuver commander would expect from his G2 in the traditional sense. We must move away from historical reporting and give our network defenders and commanders actionable intelligence.

DEFENSE SYSTEMS: How has the cybersecurity threat changed during the past decade?
REARDON: We’re seeing threats becoming ever more pervasive. We see our adversaries’ actions being enabled by tools that are easier for them to operate and easier to procure in the commercial sector. They can buy these tools anywhere; they don’t have to build them themselves.

Threats are moving away from traditional hacking to a potential capability to deny us the network-centric warfare (NCW) option at the time and place of their choosing. The NCW concept is a key component of the Army’s transformation and the basis for Future Combat Systems’ Battle Command System. Our warfighters will rightfully be expecting LandWarNet-enabled situational awareness in whatever format they need, be it a picture or text, so they won’t have to do a lot of mental gymnastics and, most important, get it when and where they need it. From a threat perspective, our adversaries will be working hard to deny us these capabilities.

DEFENSE SYSTEMS: How important are network-centric operations?
REARDON: Network-centric operations are how we prosecute war and sustain the warfighter. If an enemy can degrade or destroy that capability, the tide of the battle could easily be turned in their favor. Worse yet, if the enemy succeeds in denying our network-centric capability, our forces may not be able to deploy—we couldn’t show up to seize or defend terrain or support an ally.

DEFENSE SYSTEMS: How would you define cyberwarfare?
REARDON: Simply put, from an Army perspective, it is the use of IT and the Global Information Grid to exploit and attack networked IT tools and systems to enable our Army to close with and destroy the enemy by fire and movement and fire and maneuver.

DEFENSE SYSTEMS: How could a cyberattack result in a real assault on U.S. infrastructure, such as electrical grids or nuclear facilities?
REARDON: Our national infrastructure depends on assured information and networked, reliable IT systems. A serious enemy is most certainly examining weaknesses and vulnerabilities of supervisory and control systems used to operate and maintain our key infrastructures, such as power grids, transportation systems and the like. Our Army depends upon this infrastructure to pay soldiers, resupply forces, and move forces. It’s a huge area of concern for us.

DEFENSE SYSTEMS: Outsourcing systems and services is increasingly popular throughout DOD. Has outsourcing increased the potential risk of cyberintrusions?
REARDON: In many cases, outsourcing is the best way to get the right skill sets into the right job. We use soldiers to operate and protect our networks, because this function is vital to our network-centric warfighting capability. However, we also rely heavily on our industry partners for this task.

As long as we adhere to established industrial security and personnel security policies, coupled with using best practices for information assurance, we should be able to reasonably mitigate any risks associated with outsourcing. Again, it’s all about the mitigation of risk through knowledge.

To read more of the interview with Thomas Reardon, go to www.defensesystems.com and enter 131 in the Quickfind search box.

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