But that’s not always the case.

Historically, network issues—including attempted breaches or actual intrusions—have been left for military IT folks to figure out. Most will agree that still happens more often than not. That’s bad policy. A few years ago, a battle command lexicon was defined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 6510.0. It defines new terms for describing cybersecurity threats and incursions by classifications such as a “Category 1” incident or a “Category 5” event.

Thomas Reardon, chief of the Intelligence Division for the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal Command, says command leaders need to be as familiar with cybersecurity terms as with phrases to describe other forms of warfare.

“Given the fact we are an Army and nation at war, these incidents must be considered the equivalent of ‘incoming rounds,’ ” Reardon told me. “This is as important to a commander as any other issue involving readiness.”

Other readiness issues we examine in this cybersecurity and DOD infrastructure issue include:

• The development of the Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP), which will give IA professionals better tools to certify and accredit information systems
• DOD’s growing reliance on wireless networks and the protocols in place to secure them
• The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s Command Post of the Future system, which has affected how troops communicate in Iraq.

Without the ability to secure the data that rides on Defense networks, the concept of network-centric warfare can’t really take place. Reardon sees it as a new transformation issue because it involves radically changing the way commanders think — even the way they talk.

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