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home > April 21, 2008 issue > article
GAO says FCS threatened by software bloat
By David Perera
Special to Defense Systems
The centerpiece program of Army transformation, Future
Combat Systems, could collapse under the weight of poor software
design, according to the Government Accountability Office.
In two reports released March 10, GAO said the total source lines
of code for the $200 billion program have reached 95.1 million,
almost triple the original 2003 estimate.
“Poor size estimation is one of the main reasons that major software-
intensive acquisition programs ultimately fail,” GAO said.
The Army’s FCS program office, however, said the program
is nowhere close to failure. “Fielding the FCS Brigade Combat
Team is the cornerstone of Army modernization,” Army
spokesman Paul Mehney said. “It is a commitment, not an
option.”
FCS is a family of manned light tanks, robots and sensors that
would be able to find and shoot enemies before they attack. The
program’s success hinges on development of a communications network
that links all components — and the network is largely a software
function.
Although GAO credits the Army and FCS’ lead systems integrator,
Boeing, with attempting to put in place sound software development
practices, total lines of code nonetheless have swelled to about
four times more than other software-intensive projects such as the
Joint Strike Fighter.
Mehney said the increase is mostly because of FCS officials’ decision
to incorporate commercial technology, mainly the Red Hat version
of the Linux operating system.
“By using proven and secure COTS software, the Army is saving
costs by reducing development and evaluation time,” he said.
A better measure of program health would be to count the effective
source lines of code, which takes into account how much code
has been reused or adapted, rather than the total lines, Mehney said.
Effective line estimates have been relatively stable since 2005, he
said; GAO estimates a 15 percent growth to 19.6 million lines.
However, GAO noted that there are other problems with software
development.
Developers have complained that requirements have been poorly
defined, arrived late or were unstable. As a result, developers had
to defer some functions to future builds or waive them altogether to
keep pace with the existing schedule, GAO found.
Boeing program spokesman John Morocco noted that the build
plan calls for an incremental development approach, which “provides
the ability to learn from each previous build, as well as adjust
to any changes in technology or priorities.”
But taken in total, evidence presented by GAO points to a program
in trouble, said one defense software consultant, speaking on
condition of anonymity. “The government does hardware buying
really well, but software — they’re just incapable of doing it,” the consultant
said.
Incremental development, for instance, is a good idea. But for
it to work, it requires turnarounds of weeks rather than years, the
consultant said. “The problem with software is that new languages
come up, and also the computer hardware that the software
runs on changes so rapidly,” he said. A model of quicker
software development spirals would be possible even within the
constraints of today’s complex acquisition environment, the consultant
said. “It just takes leadership and somebody knowing
how to do it.”
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